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A Catholic Perspective on
Marriage and the Gift of
Children—With Special
Attention to Herman
Dooyeweerd’s Social Ontology
of Marriage1

by Eduardo J. Echeverria
Marriage is grounded in God’s purpose for
creation. It is the two-in-one-flesh union of a man
and a woman, with conjugal love being the integrating principle of the whole communion of marriage and family life. Gaudium et spes stated it this
way: “Marriage and conjugal love are by their nature ordained toward the begetting and educating
Dr. Eduardo J. Echeverria is Professor of Philosophy and
Theology at the Graduate School of Theology, Sacred Heart
Major Seminary, in Detroit, Michigan.

of children. Children are really the supreme gift
of marriage” (no. 50). In this short paper, I discuss
the question of how the good of marriage is related
to the gift of children, according to the Catholic
tradition. The answer to this question presupposes an understanding of the nature of marriage
and the corresponding reasons for getting married. In the twentieth century, particularly in the
fundamental theological accounts, for example, of
Dietrich von Hildebrand (1929), Pius XI in Casti
Connubii (1930), and Karol Wojtyla (1960), but
also of Reformed philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd
(1936 [1957]), who appreciably engages the thought
of Pius and Hildebrand, leading up to Vatican II’s
Gaudium et spes 47-53, the focus of these accounts
had to do with the question whether marriage is a
good in itself, an intrinsic good, that is to be sought
for its own sake; or it is an instrumental good, necessary for something else, particularly for having children. In the development of the Church’s teaching
on marriage, some theologians gave a strong personalist tone to marriage as a community of love, but
did so by opposing love to procreation; others continued to insist that procreation takes precedence
over love. Either way of framing the relationship between the good of marriage and the gift of children
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was rejected in Gaudium et spes, which formulated
this relationship as the natural ordering of marriage
and conjugal love to procreation. This paper gives
a short treatment of how Catholicism reached that
formulation. I conclude with some reference to Pope
Francis’s view in his 2016 post-synodal Apostolic
Exhortation, Amoris Laetitia.
Augustine and Aquinas
To begin with, St. Augustine’s thinking on
this question of the relationship of marriage and
children is complex. On the one hand, he defends
the goodness of marriage against the charge that
Catholics favored the Manicheans because of the
pride of place they ascribed to holy virginity in
contrast to marriage. In defending the goodness of
marriage as an intrinsic good, Augustine affirms the
marriage of persons known to be infertile: “[T]here
is good ground to inquire for what reason it [marriage] be a good. And this seems not to me to be
merely on account of the begetting of children, but
also on account of the natural society itself in a difference of sex. Otherwise it would not any longer be
called marriage in the case of old persons, especially
if either they had lost sons, or had given birth to
none. But now in good, although aged, marriage,
albeit there has withered away the glow of full age
between male and female, yet there lives in full vigor the order of charity between husband and wife.”2
On the other hand, he holds that marriage is an
instrumental good. Augustine says, “Truly we must
consider, that God gives us some goods, which are
to be sought for their own sake, such as wisdom,
health, friendship: but others, which are necessary
for the sake of others, such as learning, meat, drink,
sleep, marriage, sexual intercourse. For of these certain are necessary for the sake of wisdom, as learning: certain for the sake of health, as meat and drink
and sleep: certain for the sake of friendship, as marriage or sexual intercourse: for hence subsists the
propagation of the human kind, wherein friendly
fellowship is a great good.” In short, he concludes,
“it is good to marry, because it is good to beget children, to be a mother of a family.”3 But this is not the
only reason why marriage is good.
The good of friendship is realized in procreation,
as well as the fidelity of chastity by properly ordering our sexual desires (hence providing a “remedy for
2
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concupiscence”); finally, for Christians the goodness
of marriage is found also in its sacramental character, by making marriage indissoluble: “Therefore the
good of marriage in every nation and for all mankind lies in the purpose of procreation and in chaste
fidelity; but for the people of God, it lies also in the
holiness of the sacrament, by reason of which it is
forbidden for a woman, for so long as her husband
lives, to marry another, even if she has been put
away by her husband, and not even in order to have
children....These, therefore, are the goods that make
marriage good—offspring, fidelity, sacrament.”4
Another thinker illustrating the complexity of
the answer to this question is St. Thomas Aquinas.
He distinguishes between marriage’s primary and
secondary ends. The former end is the good of children, and the latter is the mutual help that husband
and wife give each other in marital life. Leading
Catholic moral theologian, the late Germain
Grisez, explains why, in Aquinas’s view, these two
ends are natural: “Marriage is natural in respect to
its primary end, since nature intends that children
be not only born but brought up, and this requires
the lasting tie between the parents in which marriage consists. Marriage also is natural in respect
to its second end: ‘For, just as natural reason dictates that people dwell together, since individuals
are not self-sufficient for everything that pertains to
life—which is why human beings are said to be political by nature—so, of those activities which are
required for human life, some are better suited to
men and others to women, so that nature inclines
toward a certain association of man with woman,
which is matrimony’.”5 For Aquinas, the sacrament
of marriage also has the purpose of properly ordering concupiscence to marriage’s ends, by virtue of
the sacrament’s healing grace. Therefore, Aquinas
confirms Augustine’s view that “marriage is not
good in itself but only as instrumental to the procreation and raising of children.” Nevertheless,
Grisez argues that Aquinas’s thought, too, exhibits
a certain complexity.
Aquinas coordinates marriage’s ends with the
goods of marriage: “[T]he principal end pertains
to the human couple according to their generic
nature, which they share with other animals, and
thus having and raising children is a good marriage.
The secondary end of marriage, which pertains to

the human couple precisely as human, is cooperaof family, not so much, however, with a view to
tion in the activities necessary for life; thus, the
leave after us heirs to inherit our property and forspouses owe each other fidelity, which is another of
tune, as to bring up children in the true faith and
the goods of marriage. Beyond these natural ends,
in the service of God….It was also for this reason
marriage among Christians has the end of signifythat God instituted marriage from the beginning.
ing the union of Christ and the Church, and so
A third reason has been added, as a consequence
the sacrament is a good of marriage.” Furthermore,
of the fall of our first parents. On account of the
by coordinating the good of fidelity with cooperaloss of original innocence the passions began to
tion, the question arises whether this good is inrise in rebellion against right reason; and man,
trinsic to marriage itself. Although Aquinas himself
conscious of his own frailty and unwilling to fight
never raises this question,
the battles of the flesh, is
Grisez argues that an affirsupplied by marriage with
First
published
under
the
mative answer to it is iman antidote by which to
authority of St. Pius V in
plicit in Aquinas’ thought:
avoid sins of lust.
“Marriage has its first per1566, the CateChism of the
These are ends, some
fection from its own form—
CounCil of trent answers
one of which, those who
the intrinsic principle which
the question regarding the
desire to contract marriage
makes it what it specifically
piously and religiously, as
reasons
that
man
and
is—and he describes this
becomes the children of the
a woman should be joined
form as the ‘indivisible joinSaints, should propose to
in marriage.
ing of souls, by which each
themselves.
spouse is bound to maintain
I noted earlier that St. Augustine had recognized
unbreakable fidelity with the other (Summa theo“the natural companionship [societas] between the
logiae 3, q. 29, a. 2).”6 Moreover, adds Grisez, in
two sexes” as a good of marriage. It didn’t find its inAquinas’ view friendship is not listed among the
ends or goods of marriage, but by virtue of martegral place in his understanding of the reasons for
marrying. But in the Catechism’s teaching it finally
riage’s indissolubility Aquinas argues for “maximum friendship between husband and wife, since
does: “nature itself by an instinct implanted in both
they share not only marital intercourse but the
sexes impels them to such companionship [societas].” Furthermore, the order is reversed of primary
whole of domestic life (see Summa Contra Gentiles,
3, 123).”
and secondary ends. What was primary in Aquinas’
thought, namely, offspring, becomes secondary, and
The Catechism of the Council of Trent
what was secondary, the mutual help that spouses
give each other, is now seen as a subordinate aspect
First published under the authority of St. Pius
of the first reason. Still, the Catechism advances
V in 1566, the Catechism of the Council of Trent
and hence brings a certain addition to bear upon
answers the question regarding the reasons that a
man and a woman should be joined in marriage.7
the reasons for marrying by prioritizing the comIn the Catechism’s teaching we find not only a fresh
panionship of man and woman to which nature inrestatement of traditional doctrine—offspring, ficlines. Thus, this companionship—and not just the
mutual help that spouses give each other—is mardelity, and sacrament—but also an addition and, in
riage itself rather than being extrinsic to marriage’s
this connection, a reordering of Aquinas’s primary
and secondary ends of marriage:
nature. Significantly, then, the Catechism teaches
that marriage itself is a reason to marry, an intrinsic
First of all, nature itself by an instinct implanted
good—pace St. Augustine—that should be sought
in both sexes impels them to such companionship,
after for its own sake.
and this is further encouraged by the hope of muMoreover, as in the traditional view, marriage
tual assistance in bearing more easily the discomserves to order properly sexual desires. There, marforts of life and the infirmities of old age.
riage is considered as a sacrament signifying the
A second reason for marriage is the desire
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union of Christ and the Church and, hence, the
indissolubility of marriage.
Development of Magisterial Teaching on
Marriage
The segue to magisterial teaching of Pius XI and
Pius XII is well described by Germain Grisez as the
dominance of a legalistic mentality of a canonical
definition of marriage regarding “all issues about
the meaning and value of marriage.” In the 1917
Code of Canon Law, the code defines marriage in
terms of primary and secondary ends: “The primary end of matrimony is the procreation and raising
of offspring; the secondary, mutual help and the
remedy for concupiscence.” In this canonical light,
the view that marriage is an instrumental good
for having and raising children overshadowed the
catechetical gains that had been expressed in the
Catechism of the Council of Trent. Grisez explains:
“However, that view’s very dominance provoked
the emergence of an antithesis: Even if the primary
end of marriage and marital intercourse is the procreation and raising of children, still marriage has
an intrinsic value and meaning, the spouses’ union
in mutual love, and since chaste marital intercourse
expresses this value and meaning, it too has an inherent significance. The two views’ incompatibility
and the plausibility of the second led to a development in Catholic teaching on marriage.”8
The development alluded to here by Grisez
found its expression in Pius XI’s 1930 encyclical
Casti connubii.9 Pius integrates the canonical definition of marriage into his account but does not organize his teaching around the notions of primary
and secondary ends. Yes, he holds on to the notion
that the having and raising of children holds pride
of place in marriage. Still, Pius’ synthesis will be
unique by ordering the goods of children, mutual
help, chaste marital intercourse, etc., in regards to
conjugal faith, the good of fidelity, which implicitly
includes the “ fostering of conjugal love,” according
to Grisez, “among the secondary ends of both marriage and the marital act.”10 Says Pius, “This conjugal faith, however, which is most aptly called by
St. Augustine the ‘faith of chastity’ blooms more
freely, more beautifully and more nobly, when it is
rooted in that more excellent soil, the love of husband and wife which pervades all the duties of mar4
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ried life and possesses a certain primacy of nobility
in Christian marriage” (no. 23). He explains, “The
love, then, of which We are speaking is not that
based on the passing lust of the moment nor does
it consist in pleasing words only, but in the deep
attachment of the heart which is expressed in action, since love is proved by deeds. This outward
expression of love in the home demands not only
mutual help but must go further; must have as its
primary purpose that man and wife help each other
day by day in forming and perfecting themselves in
the interior life, so that through their partnership
in life they may advance ever more and more in
virtue” (no. 23).
Pius concludes by referring us back to the
Catechism of the Council of Trent: “This mutual
molding of husband and wife, this determined effort to perfect each other, can in a very real sense,
as the Roman Catechism teaches, be said to be the
chief reason and purpose [causa et ratio] of matrimony, provided matrimony be looked at not in the
restricted sense as instituted for the proper conception and education of the child, but more widely as
the blending of life as a whole [communion] and
the mutual interchange and sharing thereof [companionship and association]” (no. 24). Thus, conjugal love is the integrating principle of marital communion, bringing about its intrinsic perfection, by
“pervading all the duties of married life and possesses a certain primacy of nobility in Christian
marriage.” Such love is expressed by action and
includes mutual help, with its primary purpose being that of the spouses helping each other to grow
in virtue and holiness. Grisez rightly summarizes
Pius’ teaching: “In this way, Pius not only recalls
the catechism’s teaching but implies that Christian
marriage is in itself a vocation and way of holiness.
Thus, he supplies another ground for questioning
the view that marriage is good only as instrumental
to offspring.”11
Still, in reaction against the canonical definition of marriage and the corresponding legalistic
mentality, some theologians (e.g., Herbert Doms)
ascribed primacy to Pius’ teaching that marriage
should be viewed “more widely as a communion,
companionship, and association of life as a whole,”
and took his point about not restricting marriage
to the having and raising of children, by regard-

ing the latter as extrinsic to the good of marriage,
standing of marriage? In Mt 19:3-8, the words
and thus children are seen as accidental (“optional
of Jesus Christ refer back to the Genesis texts of
extra”) to marriage’s intrinsic meaning. This reac1:27 and 2:24. “Back-to-creation” is the leitmotif
tion evoked a reply in 1944 from the Congregation
in Jesus’ teaching. In his own teaching regarding
for the Doctrine of the Faith, with the confirmamarital monogamy and indissolubility (Mark 10:6tion of Pius XII, declaring inadmissible the opinion
9; Matt 19:4-6), creation texts in Genesis 1-2 have
of those who “either deny that the primary end of
foundational importance, in particular Gen 1:27
marriage is the generation and education of chiland 2:24: “Male and female he created them” and
dren, or teach that the secondary ends are not es“for this reason… a man will be joined to his wife
and the two will become one flesh.” These texts
sentially subordinate to the primary end, but are
equally principal and indeare absolutely normative for
pendent.”12 Although this
marriage, indeed, for sexual
Jesus unites into an
statement does not give an
ethics.18 Jesus unites into an
inextricable nexus the
account of the whole cominextricable nexus the conconcepts of permanence,
munion of marriage and
cepts of permanence, twontwoness, and sexual
family life, it does make
ess, and sexual complemencomplementarity.19
clear that it is inadmistarity.19 Yes, Genesis 2:24
sible to displace parenthood
is about the permanence
from its central place in the intrinsic good of marof marriage; it is also about the exclusivity of the
riage. In sum, says Grisez, “There remained only
relationship: “twoness”20; but it also is about the
one alternative: to treat parenthood as part of the
fundamental prerequisite of complementary sexual
communion of married life.”13 And leading up to
differentiation for effecting the “two-in-one-flesh”
Vatican II, that is precisely what some thinkers did.
union of man and woman: “So then they are no
I turn now to Dietrich von Hildebrand, Herman
longer two but one flesh” (Mark 10:8).21 Indeed,
Dooyeweerd (who, although not Catholic but
as Pruss rightly notes, “the text [Genesis 2:24] is
Reformed, engages the thought of Hildebrand and
a seminal scriptural text on the nature of human
Pius XI), and Karol Wojtyla (the future Pope John
sexuality.”22 In short, marriage is a comprehensive,
Paul II).
multi-dimensional (e.g., fiducial, rational, emotional, volitional, and bodily-sexual) unity founded
Prior to Vatican II
on (and not only given expression in but also interSignificant thinkers in this tradition, such as
nally constituted by) a singular act of physical unity
Dietrich von Hildebrand, affirm the primacy of
that is a sign and seal of two becoming one flesh.
14
love in marital communion : “[Marriage] exists
Yes, marriage is about more than sex, but it is also
in the first place for its own sake and not excluabout nothing less than sex. In other words, bodily
sively for the sake of any result that it produces.”
union (sexual intercourse and not just fleshly conHildebrand adds, “No other earthly community
tact, rubbing bodies together) between a man and
is constituted so exclusively in its very substance
a woman, uniting biologically or organically in the
by mutual love.”15 He advances the thesis that the
bodily dimension of their being, is uniquely fitting
meaning of the sexual act in marriage, given that
for creating a bodily communion of persons that is
generative. Thus, “only a unitive act can be generamarriage is in itself, principally, a communion of
love, may not be restricted to being a mere means
tive, and only a generative act can be unitive—in
to procreation. So, the meaning of marriage, conthat only it makes two ‘one flesh’.”23 In short, the
jugal love, in its interpersonal and unitive aspect
form of love that is marriage is founded through
is a good in itself16: “Its meaning is primarily the
a bodily sexual union of man and woman as one
realization of the sublime communion of love in
flesh. One flesh unity is the body’s language for onewhich, according to the words of our Savior, ‘They
life unity. This bodily-sexual union is not extrinshall be two in one flesh’ (Matt 19:5).”17
sic to the mutual self-giving love that it signifies or
Briefly, how does Scripture frame its undersymbolizes. Of course it is a sign or symbol of that
Pro Rege—June 2018
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mutual love, but that is precisely what it is in reality because the human body is part of the personal
reality of the human being—a one-flesh union—
and not an extrinsic instrument of the self.24 The
body is intrinsic to one’s own self, not surprisingly,
since the “human body shares in the dignity of the
image of God.”25 But since the body is intrinsic to
personhood, the nature of marriage is such that it
requires sexual difference, the bodily-sexual act, as
a foundational prerequisite, indeed, as also intrinsic
to a one-flesh union. In short, only a sexual union
of male and female persons makes bodies in any
real sense “one flesh” (Gen. 2:24), with the latter
organic bodily union being a necessary condition
for the existence of conjugal marriage.
Returning to Hildebrand, we find that he has
no intention of detaching the bodily union of married love from the essential unfolding of this act in
the primary end of procreation. Indeed, the “general connection between procreation and the communion of love must always be maintained even
subjectively, at least as a general possibility of this
act.”26 He adds, “Love is the primary meaning of
marriage according to the creation [Schöpfungssinn
der Ehe], just as its primary end according to the
creation [Schöpfungszweck] is the begetting of new
human beings.”27 Although Hildebrand leaves unexplained here the relation between “meaning” and
“end,” it is clear throughout his book that the relationship is such that this end and others are to
be realized on the basis of marital love as its integrating principle. Put differently, marital love is the
integrating principle of the intimate interpersonal
two-in-one-flesh union in which husband and
wife reciprocally complement one another in their
mutual self-donation, bringing to fulfillment the
meaning of marriage in and through these ends—
offspring, fidelity, mutual help, sacrament.28
Dooyeweerd’s Social Ontology of Marriage29
Because he, too, affirms the primacy of love in
marital communion, the Dutch Reformed philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd also values Pius XI’s,
Casti Connubii. As we noted above, Pius writes,
“This mutual molding of husband and wife, this
determined effort to perfect each other, can in a
very real sense, as the Roman Catechism teaches,
be said to be the chief reason and purpose of matri6
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mony, provided matrimony be looked at not in the
restricted sense as instituted for the proper conception and education of the child, but more widely as
the blending of life as a whole and the mutual interchange and sharing thereof” (no. 24). Although
Pius explained the blessings of marriage in terms
of the three goods of marriage, namely, offspring,
conjugal faith, and the sacrament, it is clear from
this passage that husband and wife should seek
to realize these goods according to its integrating
principle, which is conjugal love. Dooyeweerd remarks, “This encyclical frankly assigned ‘primary
of honor’ (principatus nobilitatis) to married love
in a Christian marriage. All this was in striking
contrast with what happened in Protestant circles
two years later, when the moral theologian Emil
Brunner published his book Das Gebot und die
Ordnungen, in which love, if viewed as the basis of
marriage, was called a ‘sandy ground’ and marital
love was identified with erotic inclination!”30
Dooyeweerd raises a similar objection to what
he calls the “rationalistic conception of married
love as essentially a ‘blind passion’….When this individualistic rationalism found its way in Protestant
ethics there was of course no longer any possibility
of a really Christian notion of married love as the
most intense moral bi-unity. Symptomatic is the utterance recorded by P. Kluckhohn of the Methodist
preacher William Whitefield (1714-1770), who
boasted that in his proposal of marriage there
had been no question of love: ‘God be praised, if I
know my own heart a little I am free of that foolish passion which the world calls love’. This shows
how far the rationalistic utilitarian spirit of the
Enlightenment had penetrated under the guise of
Puritan piety.”31 Hildebrand follows up his citation
of the Methodist Whitefield with an old Catholic
prayer that speaks of marriage as “the mystery of
love”: “O God, at the creation of mankind, making
woman from man Thou hast already ordained that
there should be a union of the flesh and of sweet
love….Lord our God, Thou has created man pure
and immaculate and still Thou wishest that in procreation of the generations one be made from the
other by the mystery of love.”32
Dooyeweerd gratefully acknowledges that
“[Hildebrand] voices the Biblical-Christian conception of the conjugal bond as a typical and in-

Robert George, Patrick Lee, John Paul II,38et al.,
comparable institutional love-union between husband and wife, [and] as the expression of the eternal
Dooyeweerd argues that the internal structural
love of Christ towards the Church as His Bride.”33
principle of the marital love-communion, the
Not entirely taken with Hildebrand’s book, howethical aspect of this love-community being its
ever, Dooyeweerd also claims that Hildebrand
qualifying function, may not be detached from,
“detaches the inner meaning-structure of married
in Dooyeweerd’s words, “its biotic foundation in
love from its temporal biotic foundation in the
the organic difference between the sexes.” In other
organic difference between the sexes.” But this is
words, Dooyeweerd upholds the conjugal view of
simply not the case. Hildebrand explicitly asserts
marriage in which two people—a man and a womthe contrary: “The special character of conjugal
an—who unite in marriage, must, in addition to
love is, furthermore, marked
other things, unite organiby the fact that this love can
cally, meaning thereby in
In
short,
only
a
sexual
only come into being, bethe bodily-sexual dimenunion of male and female
tween men and women and
sion of their being—marpersons makes bodies in
not between persons of the
riage’s founding function
same sex, as is the case with
(in Dooyeweerd’s terms).
any real sense "one flesh"
friendship, parental love, or
Suffice it to say, therefore,
(Gen. 2:24), with the latter
filial love.”34
that essential to a Christian
organic
bodily
union
being
a
Still, Dooyeweerd rightunderstanding of marriage
necessary condition
ly holds that “Marriage is
is the normative significance
for the existence of
of sexual differentiation: the
… intrinsically qualified
as a moral community of
male-female prerequisite is
conjugal marriage.
love for the duration of the
the foundational structural
dimension of the Godcommon life-span of two
persons of different sex.” The moral aspect of this
ordained conjugal view of marriage, essential for
nuptial intimacy and openness to the gift of life.
love relationship (its qualifying or leading function), shows an individuality type that “refers back
Complementary sexual differentiation is divinely
to … the organic life-aspect of the conjugal relaintended in the order of creation; hence bodily-sextion, namely, the lasting sexual biotic bond beual union is a necessary condition for marriage, in
tween husband and wife.” Strictly speaking, “The
order for its unitive and procreative ends to be realmoral individuality-type of the conjugal love-comized. Thus, “only a unitive act can be generative,
munity is typically [emphasis added] founded in the
and only a generative act can be unitive—in that
35
sexual-biotic function of marriage.” As he argues
only it makes two ‘one flesh’.”39 As Dooyeweerd
elsewhere, the internal structural principle of the
explains,
marital love-communion, the ethical aspect of this
The marriage bond, as such, is typically founded
love-community being its qualifying function, may
in the institutional (and not in an incidental)
not be detached from, in Dooyeweerd’s words, “its
sexual union of husband and wife, which is unbiotic foundation in the organic difference between
doubtedly made serviceable for the propagation
the sexes.”36 Again, he says, “According to its two
of the human race. It is according to the order of
radical functions (the moral and biotic functions)
the creation that normally marriage leads to the
the marriage community can be described as a
formation of a family. In other words, the typicommunity of moral life-long love between huscal foundational relation between the family and
band and wife based on a relatively durable organic
the conjugal bond implies the natural disposition of
sexual bond.”37
the latter to procreation. In this sense marriage may
It would take us too far afield here to discuss
be called the “germ-cell” of the family-relationship.
the nature of the unity in becoming “one flesh.”
Both communities remain most intensely interwoAlong with many contemporary Catholic thinkven during the time of their actual existence. Yet
ers, such as the late Germain Grisez, John Finnis,
marriage, as a love-communion, maintains its own
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structure notwithstanding its interwovenness with
the family.40

Thus, Dooyeweerd holds that “marriage, as
a love-communion, maintains its own structure
notwithstanding its interwovenness with the family.”41 It would take us too far afield to elaborate
Dooyeweerd’s conceptual articulation of that interwovenness in light of his notion of enkaptic interlacement. For now, let us consider his brief elaboration of that interwovenness. He writes,
After having gained a sufficient insight into the
inner structure of the marriage bond [as a biunitary love-communion founded on the organic
unity of biotic complementarity] we shall now try
to deepen our insight into its inner coherence with
the family. According to the divine order of creation marriage is intentionally adapted to the family relationship. [T]
his means that marriage is enriched and deepened
by its natural interweaving with the family relationship, and conjugal love is deepened and enriched
in parental love….When the marriage bond has
expanded into a family relationship the former is
enriched and deepened in its meaning by its close
interweaving with the latter, because its bi-unity
in conjugal love has produced a unity in plurality. In the conjugal union, as such, the expression
of the personality in the temporal existence of
each of the married persons is enriched, enlarged
and completed by that of the other. A woman becomes “wife” in the full sense of the word only
in the conjugal union with her husband, and vice
versa. And the expression of the personality in the
bi-unitary bond assumes a wider and deeper perspective in the multi-unitary bond of the family.42

Dooyeweerd wishes to affirm marriage’s intrinsic value, an interpersonal union that is in itself
good, rather than to see marriage as a mere instrumental good for the extrinsic purposes of having
and raising children. He correctly understands
that the internal meaning-structure of married
love may not be detached from “its biotic foundation in the organic difference between the sexes.”43
Dooyeweerd also holds that the marriage bond, as
a love-communion, is typically founded in sexual
difference: the organic unity of male and female
in conjugal sex is the foundational function of the
8
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structural whole that is marital union.
In the above passage, on the one hand, he makes
it clear that that this union is naturally fulfilled by
bearing and raising children. Thus, he does not displace parenthood as an integral part of the communion of married life. Still, Dooyeweerd insists, on
the other hand, “[I]t is not possible to deduce the essential internal structure of the marriage-bond from
the ‘cosmic purpose of propagation’, as was [allegedly] done by Thomas Aquinas.” “This traditional
universalistic construction,” adds Dooyeweerd,
“necessarily results in an eradication of the boundaries between the marriage union and the family
relationship.”44 The eradication of the boundaries
between marriage and family is, he argues, implied
by Aquinas’ attempt to deduce the essential internal
structure of the marriage-bond from the “cosmic
purpose of propagation.” He writes,
This is evident from Thomas’ statement that posterity is essential to the marital bond [4 Sent. Dist.
31, q. I, a. 3, c]. Such a construction must naturally restrict itself to a deduction of the general
institution of marriage from the purpose of procreation….[But] in its application to the factual
relationships [of marriage] Thomas’ view leads to
constructions of a very artificial and internally
contradictory character. We need only mention his
explanations of the relation between the individual
act of sexual uniting and the “objective procreative
purpose.” Thomas concedes that sexual intercourse
in a barren marriage, or in general such which is
not carried on with a concrete procreative intention, is morally permissible. But then it will not do
to seek the inner essence of the conjugal institution in
the aim of propagation. Then the internal structure
of the marriage bond, in its difference from the
family relationship, irresistibly forces itself upon
us….The marriage bond… normally embraces
husband and wife for life, independent of the
natural procreative end. No “rational procreative
purpose” can justify the sexual consummation of
marriage in an ethical sense, but only married love
sanctified in Christ. This love (and not a utilitarian
kind of thought) is the true regulator and educator
of married life towards temperance and chastity. In
the divine order of creation, marriage is the only
ordered way to form a family; marriage and family
are mutually adapted to each other. But they retain

their own peculiar internal structure and value. If
this is ignored or misinterpreted, our marital morality will result in a labyrinth of contradictions of
our own creating, and the lucid simplicity of the
divine ordinance [of marriage] will be obscured.45

For the Creator, by giving man and woman a rational nature and the ability to determine consciously
their acts, gave them thereby the power to choose
by themselves the end to which sexual intercourse
leads in a natural way. And where two persons can
choose together a certain good as an end, there
Dooyeweerd’s main point is right: marriage
the possibility of love also exists. Therefore, the
isn’t merely for having children, as if to say that it
Creator does not use persons merely as means or
is merely a means to the procreative end. Indeed, it
tools of his creative power, but opens before them
is precisely for this reason that, in 1936, as I noted
the possibility of a particular realization of love.
above, Dooyeweerd already
It depends on them whether
expressed his appreciation
He correctly understands
they will place their sexual
for the work of Catholic
intercourse on the level of
that the internal meaningphilosopher Dietrich von
love, on the level proper to
structure of married love
Hildebrand on marriage,
persons, or below this level.
Die Ehe (1929).
may not be detached from
And the Creator wills not
"its biotic foundation in
only the preservation of the
Wojtyla’s Reflection on
the organic difference
species through sexual interMarriage
course, but also its preserbetween
the
sexes."
Karol Wojtyla, too, revation based on love that is
jects the idea that marriage
worthy of persons.48

is a means to an end, and hence he agrees with
Dooyeweerd’s point as well as Hildebrand’s. In his
1960 work, Love and Responsibility, Wojtyla rejects
what he calls the “rigorist and puritan interpretation” of the conjugal life and sexual intercourse,
which sees the latter as instrumental goods serving
the purpose of procreation.46 Wojtyla carefully distinguishes this interpretation from the Manichean
tradition because “this view does not reject marriage as something evil that in itself is evil and unclean due to being ‘bodily’ as was maintained by
the Manicheans.” Rather, it “contents itself with
stating the permissibility of marriage for the sake
of the good of the species.”47 Against this view,
Wojtyla argues, “By joining in sexual intercourse,
a man and a woman join themselves as rational
and free persons, and their union has a morel value
when it is justified by true conjugal love. Hence, if
we can say that the Creator ‘uses’ the sexual union
of persons to realize the order of existence intended
by him within the species Homo sapiens, it definitely may not be held that the Creator uses persons
merely as means to an end intended by himself.”
In response to the question why is this so, Wojtyla
then adds,

So, Wojtyla’s claim here is no different from
Dooyeweerd’s point that the inner essence of marriage may not be sought in the purpose of having children; rather, absolutely peculiar about the
meaning of the marital bond is the constant loveunion between husband and wife. Furthermore,
like Hildebrand, Wojtyla regards procreation to be
the primary end of marriage because “procreation
is objectively, ontologically, a more important purpose than that man and woman should live together, complement each other and support each other
(mutuum adiutorium), just as this second purpose
is in turn more important that the appeasement of
natural desire.”49 Wojtyla clarifies here that each of
the traditional reasons for marriage, namely, the
having and raising of children, mutual help, and
remedium concupiscentiae, which is a legitimate orientation for desire, are all expressions of “love as a
virtue.” He adds, “However, opposing love to procreation or indicating a primacy of procreation over
love is out of the question.”50 Wojtyla elaborates:
Besides, the realization of these ends is a complex
fact. A complete, positive exclusion of the possibility of procreation undoubtedly diminishes or even
eliminates the possibility of durable, mutual co-
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education of the spouses themselves. Procreation
unaccompanied by this co-education and co-striving for the highest good would also be in a certain
sense incomplete and incompatible with the love
of the person. Indeed, the point here is not only
and exclusively the material multiplication of the
headcount within the human species, but also education—whose natural substratum is the family
based on marriage—cemented by mutuum adiutorium. If an interior cooperation between a woman
and a man exists in marriage, and if they know
how to educate and complement…each other,
then their love matures to become the basis of the
family. However, marriage is not identified with
family and always remains, above all, an intimate
union of two people.51

Thus, significantly, for Wojtyla, just as it is for
Hildebrand and Dooyeweerd, love is not an end of
marriage; rather, love is the single, that is, integral
but complex meaning of marriage that is expressed
and fulfilled in each of these ends, though most essentially and fully in procreation, which is the primary end of marriage. In the transition to Vatican
II, I conclude with Hildebrand: “Marriage, as well
as the marital act, has meaning not only because
of procreation, but also as the expression and fulfillment of a deep union of love.”52 This position,
emphasizing the centrality of conjugal love in
Christian marriage, but without opposing love to
procreation nor yet of suggesting that procreation
takes precedence over love, will receive an adequate
treatment in Gaudium et spes. In the next section
of this paper, I turn to give a brief account of that
treatment.
Gaudium et spes
Although Vatican II’s Gaudium et spes53 consciously avoids the language of primary and secondary ends, it nevertheless affirms the truth behind the traditional formulation by stating that the
having and raising of children naturally belongs to
the full unfolding of marriage, with conjugal love
being the integrating principle: “By their very nature, the institution of matrimony itself and conjugal love are ordained for the procreation and education of children, and find in them their ultimate
crown” (no. 48). On this view, conjugal love is the
10
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“vivifying source,” as Grisez puts it, “of the whole
communion of marriage and family life.” Conjugal
love is, in Gaudium et spes, the integrating principle
in its reflections on marriage and the family. Grisez
explains: “Marriage and the family are a ‘community of love’ (no. 47); marriage itself is an ‘intimate
community of conjugal life and love’ (no. 48);
conjugal love ‘is uniquely expressed and perfected
through the marital act’ and such acts ‘signify and
foster that mutual self-giving by which spouses enrich each other with joyful and grateful hearts’ (no.
49); the fruitfulness of marriage is treated as the
fulfillment of conjugal love: [‘Marriage and conjugal love are by their nature ordained toward the
begetting and educating of children. Children are
really the supreme gift of marriage and contribute
very substantially to the welfare of their parents’.];
and the problem of birth regulation [responsible
parenthood] is seen as one of harmonizing conjugal
love with respect for life (see no. 51).”54 In short,
adds Grisez, according to Gaudium et spes, “conjugal communion is designed to be, and normally
is, an intrinsically good part of a larger, intrinsically good whole: the family. Thus, parenthood,
is the intrinsic fulfillment of the intimate union
of persons [of husband and wife] and actions.”55
Avoiding the language of primary and secondary
ends, but still affirming the truth that parenthood
is essential to the meaning of marriage, he implies
that children are not the end to which marriage is
an instrumental good; nor are they a means, sometimes even seen as an optional extra, to the couple’s
fulfillment. Rather, the having and raising of children are the realization and hence fulfillment of the
good of the marital communion of conjugal love.
This teaching was reconfirmed by John Paul II in
Familiaris consortio (1981)56:
In its most profound reality, love is essentially a
gift; and conjugal love, while leading the spouses
to the reciprocal “knowledge” which makes them
“one flesh,” does not end with the couple, because
it makes them capable of the greatest possible gift,
the gift by which they become cooperators with
God for giving life to a new human person. Thus
the couple, while giving themselves to one another, give not just themselves but also the reality of
children, who are a living reflection of their love, a
permanent sign of conjugal unity and a living and

inseparable synthesis of their being a father and a
mother (no. 14).

In the final section of this paper, I turn to Pope
Francis’ 2016 post-synodal Apostolic Exhortation,
Amoris Laetitia.57
Pope Francis’s Amoris Laetitia
Vatican II’s teaching is heartily reconfirmed
again in Amoris Laetitia (hereafter AL). Pope
Francis writes (AL, no. 80),

of the specific act of the conjugal love of the parents” [Donum vitae, II, 8]. This is the case because,
“according to the order of creation, conjugal love
between a man and a woman, and the transmission of life are ordered to each other (cf. Gen 1:2728). Thus the Creator made man and woman share
in the work of his creation and, at the same time,
made them instruments of his love, entrusting to
them the responsibility for the future of mankind,
through the transmission of human life” [Relatio
Finalis 2015, 63].

Marriage is firstly an “inMoreover, the gift
Furthermore, emphasiztimate partnership of life
ing that the child should be
character
of
the
child
and love” [Gaudium et spes
welcomed as a gift of God,
entails his immense
48] which is a good for the
as he does in the above pasworth, his uniqueness,
spouses themselves, while
sage, Francis also affirms
sexuality is “ordered to the
irreplaceability, and
that the “family is the setting
conjugal love of man and
hence may never be used
in which new life is not only
woman” [Catechism of the
for
one's
own
ends.
born but also welcomed”
Catholic Church, no. 2360].
(AL, no. 166), with open[Thus] the conjugal union is
ness and affection, regardless of the circumstances.
ordered to procreation “by its very nature” [GaudIndeed, he adds, “The gift of a new child, entrusted
ium et spes 48].58

In this light we can understand that Francis,
too, gives a strong personalist tone to marriage as a
community of love, but does not do so by opposing
love to procreation or by insisting that procreation
takes precedence over love. He says, in short, “Love
always gives life” (AL, no. 165):
The child who is born “does not come from outside as something added on to the mutual love of
the spouses, but springs from the very heart of that
mutual giving, as its fruit and fulfilment” [Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 2366]. He or
she does not appear at the end of a process, but is
present from the beginning of love as an essential
feature, one that cannot be denied without disfiguring that love itself. From the outset, love refuses
every impulse to close in on itself; it is open to
a fruitfulness that draws it beyond itself. Hence
no genital act of husband and wife can refuse this
meaning [Humanae vitae, nos. 11-12], even when
for various reasons it may not always in fact beget
a new life. A child deserves to be born of that love,
and not by any other means, for “he or she is not
something owed to one, but is a gift” [Catechism of
the Catholic Church, no. 2378], which is “the fruit

by the Lord to a father and a mother, begins with
acceptance, continues with lifelong protection and
has as its final goal the joy of eternal life. By serenely
contemplating the ultimate fulfillment of each human person, parents will be even more aware of the
precious gift entrusted to them” (Ibid). Moreover,
the gift character of the child entails his immense
worth, his uniqueness, irreplaceability, and hence
may never be used for one’s own ends. Rather, children should be loved unconditionally. “This love,”
Francis states, “is shown to them through the gift
of their personal name, the sharing of language,
looks of love and the brightness of a smile. In this
way, then learn that the beauty of human relationships touches our soul, seeks our freedom, accepts
the difference of others, recognizes and respects
them as a partner in dialogue” (AL, no. 172).
In this context, Francis emphasizes the importance of children being raised by a married mother
and father and, hence, of the complementarity of
the sexes in parenting because mothers and fathers
are not interchangeable (AL, nos. 172-76). This
emphasis fits well his rejection of “an ideology of
gender that ‘denies the difference and reciprocity in
nature of a man and a woman and envisages a sociPro Rege—June 2018
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ety without sexual differences, thereby eliminating
the anthropological basis of the family’” (AL, no.
56; nos. 285-286).
One final point regarding Francis’ reflections
on children pertains to their moral formation, as
well as their education in the faith (AL, nos. 287290), and sex education (AL, nos. 280-85). In
short, Francis is persuaded that civilization depends
on strong, stable marriages and hence families for
integral human development (AL, nos. 274-278).
Parents are the primary educators of their children,
and hence of their moral formation as well, which
includes their sex education. Indeed, he says, “the
family is the first school of human values, where
we learn the wise use of freedom” (AL, no. 274).
He says, “A person’s affective and ethical development is ultimately grounded in a particular experience, namely, that his or her parents can be trusted.
This means that parents, as educators, are responsible, by their affection and example, for instilling
in their children trust and loving respect” (AL,
no. 263). Included in this moral formation is the
shaping of the will, the good of the intellect, by
developing good habits with the aim of “interiorizing values into sound and steady ways of acting”
(AL, no. 266). This interiorizing is about the formation of virtues, which is a steadfast inner principle of operation.” Francis adds, “The virtuous life
thus builds, strengthens and shapes freedom, lest
we become slaves of dehumanizing and antisocial
inclinations” (AL, no. 267). In this connection, it
is important to see that Francis opposes any theory
of nurturing, of child-rearing, which transfers or
replaces the uniquely indispensable responsibility
of parents, of mother and father, to specialists and
experts, rendering it a professional task outside the
family, particularly by the state. To use a handy
phrase coined by Peter and Brigitte Berger in their
significant study on the family,59 Francis decidedly
opposes the “professionalization of parenthood.”60
Mindful that this was one of the brain-storming papers at the bi-annual meeting (December
2, 2017) of Evangelicals and Catholics Together,
enough was said in this paper about marriage and
family to begin a conversation on the nature and
ends of marriage and family.
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